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As we step back into the world in which we live now, a number of important
lessons arise from the foregoing scenarios that can help to provide general
policy guidance.
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LESSON ONE
Contrasting yet plausible stories can be told for how the world
and its regions will develop in the next 30 years; each has fundamentally
different implications for the environment. |
Earlier chapters of GEO-3 have outlined important and very specific
changes that emerged over the past 30 years, and there is no reason to
believe that the next 30 will be any less dynamic. Using scenarios, it
is possible to tell strongly contrasting but plausible stories about how
the world and its regions might develop in the future. None of the stories
requires exotic surprises to materialize and elements of each of the four
scenarios can already be discerned in today's world. In appreciating the
scenarios, it is important to realize that, in real life, they are not
mutually exclusive. A given region may experience all four or a combination
of several at once. And although the scenarios have been presented as
fairly uniform across the world, it is clear that not all regions have
experienced, are experiencing, or will experience the same developments.
Examining the environmental implications casts a spotlight on the differences
across scenarios, regions and issues. These variations have been illustrated
in the narratives, the quantitative material and the differing outcomes
of particular events or trends.
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LESSON TWO
There can be significant delays between human actions, including
policy decisions, and associated impacts on the environment, specifically:
- much of the environmental change that will occur over the
next 30 years has already been set in motion by past and current
actions
- many of the effects of environmentally relevant policies
put into place over the next 30 years will not be apparent until
long afterwards.
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Sustainability First implies the most positive environmental outlook
of the four scenarios. Markets First and Security First conjure
up much more pessimistic pictures, but for very different reasons. This
contrast is reflected in the issues that come most conspicuously to the
fore in each scenario. For example, water shortages are generally more
of a problem in Markets First, reflecting increasing resource demand,
whereas urban pollution and loss of biodiversity are more marked in Security
First, reflecting a lack of effective environmental policies. Policy
First falls somewhere in between - some of the environmental targets
are met, through a mainly top-down approach, whereas it is unrealistic
to make significant progress on others without a broader commitment to
change.
Social and economic systems can be notoriously slow to change. The basic
infrastructure of modern society, including transportation and energy
systems, cannot be refashioned rapidly without great expense. Financial
and political systems, and basic behaviour patterns also tend to exhibit
overpowering inertia. Furthermore, even when social systems change, resulting
in reduced pressures on the environment, time lags in natural systems
can delay the ultimate response to these changes. Therefore, it is important
to consider not only the state of the environment at the end of the time
horizon for these scenarios, but also the trends.
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LESSON THREE
Achieving widely agreed environmental and social goals will
require dramatic and coordinated action starting now and continuing
for a number of years. Steps must include policies based on prevention
and adaptation.
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This proviso is perhaps most clearly seen in the case of climate change
impacts, which differ minimally between the scenarios in most regions
over the next 30 years. This is because much of the climatic change expected
to occur over the next 30 years is the result of actions that have already
been taken. It is not surprising that the issues which stand out as the
most difficult to tackle - halting land degradation, preserving biodiversity
and ensuring access to freshwater - are all linked to climate change among
other factors. The intractable nature of these impacts is also related
to the fact that they are driven by fundamental human demands and are
not easily amenable to technical fixes.
The environmental implications of the various scenarios illustrate the
legacy of the past decades and the level of effort that will be needed
to reverse powerful trends. These challenges can only be met with robust
and coordinated action at all levels of government and among many different
sectors of society. The scenarios also demonstrate that it can take many
years for important social and environmental indicators to diverge from
one another. Given the likelihood that large numbers of people will continue
to be vulnerable to environmental change, even where the scenarios point
to eventual achievement of environmental goals, adaptation policies will
be needed to complement mitigation policies. Among other reasons, these
may be necessary to meet social goals, minimize the transient effects
of environmental change, prevent irreversible losses, and maintain the
enthusiasm for the necessary social and political will to achieve the
long-term goals.
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LESSON FOUR
Important linkages exist between different environmental issues
and between environmental and broader social issues. It follows
that:
- policy can be made more effective by looking for synergies
or 'co-benefits'
- care must be taken to avoid conflicts between policies.
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The scenarios presented here demonstrate the importance of interlinkages
between the environmental, social, economic and political spheres, both
within and across regions. The complex interplay between human and natural
systems calls for approaches that treat social, economic and environmental
concerns in an integrated fashion.
Positive synergies between policies can be maximized. For example, well-designed
policies can simultaneously address issues such as climate change, transport,
and urban and regional air pollution. Thus, ambitious climate policies
could serve as a cornerstone of modern, integrated environmental programmes
in many situations.
In other cases, connections imply potential conflicts. The large-scale
introduction of modern biofuels in certain regions as a substitute for
fossil fuels, a feature of the Policy First scenario, could have
adverse implications for biodiversity and agriculture in these areas.
Similarly, the use of biotechnology and genetic engineering to improve
agricultural productivity could, rather than reducing the demand for agricultural
land, lead to a dramatic expansion if organisms are genetically modified
to be able to thrive in areas currently unsuitable for widespread crop
production or grazing. This outcome would have serious implications for
biodiversity and land management.
| Reflections on the use of scenarios |
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For this Global Environment Outlook a scenario approach has been
chosen that deliberately emphasizes the possibility of many different
futures rather than the probability of any single one. None of the
four scenarios that has been presented should be viewed as more
or less likely than the others, or as a reference scenario from
which the others represent variants. Recent experience and reflections
upon issues such as insufficient information (ignorance), the complexity
of human and natural systems (surprise), and the ability of humans
to choose (volition), suggests that for longer range policy thinking
it is not only disingenuous to presume we can know the most likely
future, but that it is also detrimental to good policy making because
it unnecessarily narrows our vision (Raskin and Kemp-Benedict 2002).
The process also revealed some of the challenges in such a scenario
exercise. The choice to begin with global archetypes aided in the
effort to create sets of nested global and regional scenarios that
were consistent with each other. At the same time, this choice arguably
limited the range of scenarios that might have arisen had the regional
scenario teams been able to operate more independently. The efforts
to combine narrative scenarios with quantitative information coming
out of models and other analytical tools also drew attention to
the need to use consistent assumptions in the two approaches. The
quantitative underpinning certainly helped to stimulate the development
of the narrative scenarios and provided both consistency checks
and powerful means of depicting the differences between the four
scenarios in the different regions. It remains apparent, though,
that the existing quantitative tools are limited in their ability
to capture the richness of narrative scenarios, particularly where
these involve significant departures from the current situation.
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LESSON FIVE
The establishment of strong institutions for environmental governance
is a prerequisite for almost all other policies.
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There is a need to be aware of both the small and the large-scale effects
of policies, particularly those related to the introduction of new technologies.
On a small scale, stimulating better technology to deliver the same services
with less resource use is clearly a robust policy that makes sense in
almost any conceivable scenario. If scaled up, however, two possible drawbacks
arise. First, the improved efficiency may induce an increased level of
activity (such as additional travelling in improved motor vehicles), which
outweighs the gains achieved by better technology (in this instance lower
fuel consumption or lower pollution emissions per kilometre travelled).
Second, new technologies that increase dependence, either on other countries
or on the technology itself, can increase vulnerability of regions to
disruptions in, or misuse of, these technologies.
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LESSON SIX
Ensuring timely access to accurate information is a robust policy,
as it:
- allows for early warning of environmental problems
- can stimulate voluntary action by business and industry
- can support formal and informal marketbased mechanisms that
promote good environmental conduct.
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A fundamental distinction between the four scenarios lies in the existence
and effectiveness of strong institutions for environmental governance.
The scenarios represent largely different political attitudes, citizen
values and degrees of acceptance of (or action against) inequality. The
political will and vision of governments and other authorities determine,
above all else, whether environmentally sustainable development comes
within reach worldwide. Where strong institutions for environmental governance
are absent, as in Security First, or afforded a lower status than
other institutions, as in Markets First, improvements in environmental
conditions are less likely to occur. As the range of concerns traverses
the local to the global, so must these institutions. Furthermore, as all
sectors of society are, in some way, both responsible for and impacted
by the status of natural and human systems, these institutions must reach
across these sectors. Thus, not only formal governments, but also business,
NGOs and other elements of civil society must play a role, individually
and in partnership, in establishing and maintaining these institutions.
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LESSON SEVEN
Not all policy instruments are appropriate for all situations.
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Ensuring and stimulating timely access to information is crucial not
only for keeping abreast of the current state of environmental and social
systems and trends in both, but also for coordinating action to address
emerging or existing problems. Efforts are required to ensure that key
public information remains accessible, and that more flows are established.
A fundamental message, from Policy First and Sustainability
First in particular, is that information can both encourage voluntary
action and increase the effectiveness of other policies. The flow of accurate
information can therefore actively support other policies. Conversely,
as Security First most notably shows, when economic and political
relations polarize, the control of information can be an important instrument
of power.
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LESSON EIGHT
The achievement of environmental goals will require decisive
action, will encounter unforeseen eventualities and will not happen
overnight. Fortunately or unfortunately, much of the success or
failure of this endeavour is in our hands.
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It is clear that there are particular policy instruments that are more
in accordance with different types of worlds. For example, market-based
instruments such as capping and trading systems for curbing pollutants
will find a niche in a world that resembles Markets First, whereas
ambitious zoning and other spatial planning measures would not go down
so well. Similarly, ecolabelling will be suited to a world that resembles
Sustainability First, but forcibly restricting access to protected
areas would be much less suitable. This same argument implies that the
most appropriate choice of policy instruments can vary between different
regions or at different times. Careful selection of specific and appropriate
policy instruments is clearly very important.
The final lesson from the scenarios presented in this chapter may be
one of perspective. The four scenarios show that the future is not something
that we should wait for passively. Rather, the choices we have made in
the past, those we are currently making and those we will make in the
future all strongly influence in which world we will live. There will
be many branch points when stakeholders will have the opportunity to turn
in one direction or another, whether towards Markets First or towards
Policy First, Security First, Sustainability First or
another, as yet unimagined, scenario. Being aware of threats, opportunities
and the possible outcomes of different choices is a prerequisite to effective
policy making.
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